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THE CRAFT OF DUE PROCESS 
KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL* 
Professor Israel’s aim in telling the story of the Supreme Court’s 
development of interpretative guidelines for due process “is to provide a 
springboard for further exploration of the appropriate role of free-standing due 
process . . . .”1  He has certainly achieved his goal, offering as he does in this 
year’s Childress Lecture an array of due process issues for lawyers, judges and 
academics to examine. 
One such question that recurred to me as I read Professor Israel’s article is 
how receptive the Supreme Court’s conception of due process is to reform of 
our criminal justice system by means other than constitutional amendment.  In 
determining whether a particular procedural right is so fundamental as to be 
protected by due process, for example, the Court has offered alternative 
reference points.  As Professor Israel notes, the Court at times has suggested 
that the proper frame of reference for determining the fundamental nature of a 
procedural right is a broad one, the universality of the right to all civilized 
systems.2  At other times the Court has suggested a narrower frame of 
reference for determining this issue, whether the right has been recognized 
within the Anglo-American common law tradition.3  In 1968, the Court in 
Duncan v. Louisiana4 appeared to have resolved this ambiguity by adopting 
the narrower of these standards—”whether . . . a procedure is necessary to an 
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty”5—as the appropriate touchstone 
for due process analysis.  To what degree does this choice ossify American 
criminal procedure?  Does the choice of an Anglo-American standard for due 
process analysis effectively insulate a troubled American criminal justice 
 
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.  The author thanks Melvin 
Durchslag, Lewis Katz, and Robert Lawry for providing helpful comments on a draft of this 
article. 
 1. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process in Criminal Procedure: The Supreme 
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 305-06 (2001). 
 2. Id. at 352-55. 
 3. Id. 
 4. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 5. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14. 
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system from reforms inspired by continental systems outside the Anglo-
American tradition?6 
Another important question Professor Israel’s article suggests is whether 
the Supreme Court’s conception of due process and other constitutional 
criminal procedure rights as developed during the past century is compatible 
with the volume of offenses and offenders currently processed by the 
American criminal justice system.  That conception adopts the view that each 
criminal defendant is entitled to an elaborate constellation of rights such as 
trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses and protection against self-
incrimination.  The elaborate nature of this conception, though, seems out of 
touch with the mass production quality of our criminal justice system, which 
recently reached a new record of incarcerating more than two million people.7  
As this figure suggests, providing an elaborate set of rights to each defendant 
would be extremely costly.  Instead of fulfilling the promise of the Supreme 
Court’s conception of criminal procedure rights, our criminal justice system 
threatens and entices ninety-four percent of defendants8 into accepting a much 
cruder, simpler and less costly procedure: the negotiated guilty plea, which has 
been aptly described as “a capitulation to the conditions of mass society.” 9  In 
 
 6. Professor William Pizzi has recently argued in favor of continentally inspired reform of 
the American criminal justice system.  See WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH (1999).  
Professor Pizzi argues that the Supreme Court’s current constitutional doctrines do not 
necessarily bar such reforms.  Id. at 230-31.  He notes that: 
[S]ome of the Supreme Court’s decisions are not quite the barriers to reform they might 
initially appear to be.  The Court has indicated in some of its opinions that it would reach 
a different decision if a legislature were to put forward an alternative scheme.  To give an 
important example, in Duncan v. Louisiana, which imposed the requirement of jury trial 
on the states, the Court conceded in a footnote that “[a] criminal process which was fair 
and equitable but used no juries is easy to imagine.  It would make use of alternative 
guarantees and protections which would serve the same purposes that the jury serves in 
the English and American systems.”  The Court had no option but to take this position 
because to insist that the lack of a jury made a system fundamentally unfair would 
condemn almost every western trial system in whole or part as well as international courts 
of justice which have never used juries.  But the Court went on to note that “no American 
System has undertaken to construct such a system.”  Here is an opening for a major 
reform in the states that might permit us to move away from juries in their present form.  
We could compensate for the move by adding other guarantees of fairness, such as mixed 
panels, reasoned decisions, broad appellate review, and so on. 
Id. at 231 (citations omitted). 
 7. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1999, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (2000).  The total number of Americans in jails and prisons in 
the United States reached 2,026,596 for the first time at the end of 1999.  Id. 
 8. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998, at 
2 (2000). 
 9. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (“[P]lea 
bargaining . . . is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither 
encouraged nor praised.”). 
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stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s elaborate conception, when this ninety-
four percent of defendants are convicted, no trial takes place, no jury is 
empanelled, no witnesses are called much less confronted, and the judgment of 
conviction is based almost entirely on self-incrimination by the defendant. 
The complexity and costliness inherent in the Supreme Court’s conception 
of procedural rights, then, have largely been accommodated within the volume 
of our criminal justice system by creating a two-tiered system of criminal 
justice: an elaborate level of protection for those few who stand trial but 
minimal protection for the overwhelming majority who plead guilty.  One 
criticism which can be advanced regarding the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
due process and criminal procedure generally, is that it has paid too little 
attention to cost and complexity and the volume of offenses and offenders 
processed by our criminal justice system.  Another is that the Court has 
focused its attention too narrowly on the few who go to trial and showed too 
little concern for the overwhelming majority who plead guilty. 
Such questions—whether our criminal justice system has been rendered 
too difficult to reform or too complex to deal effectively with the volume of 
offenses and offenders brought before American courts—though important, 
ultimately go to the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s approach to due process.  I 
leave detailed examination of these issues for another day and following 
Professor Israel’s lead, I focus in the following pages on the craft rather than 
the ultimate wisdom of the Supreme Court’s due process methodology. 
I have three reactions to offer in response to Professor Israel’s lecture.  The 
first is an observation contrasting the expansive exercise of judicial power 
under the due process clause with the restriction of judicial power in other 
areas of law which converge with the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence to control the criminal justice system.  This comparison helps in 
understanding why the Supreme Court’s due process methodology suffers from 
the two problems Professor Israel describes at the end of his lecture: (1) 
unacknowledged departures from prior case law and (2) ambiguities and 
inconsistencies among cases regarding the standards the Supreme Court has 
offered in support of its interpretations of due process in criminal cases.10  The 
second point deals with the Supreme Court’s failure to distinguish clearly 
between rule and remedy leading to confusion about the scope of certain rules.  
My third point is a theoretical one suggesting that the confusion and 
complexity found in the Supreme Court’s due process methodology may partly 
be explained by both a general failure to articulate clearly the purposes that 
methodology seeks to serve and a particular failure to come to terms with a 
non-instrumental approach to criminal procedure. 
 
 10. Israel, supra note 1, at 427-32. 
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I. JUDICIAL LAWMAKING IN AN AGE OF LEGISLATION 
As I followed Professor Israel’s story of the development of due process, I 
was struck by the contrast between the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the 
area of criminal procedure and roughly contemporaneous developments in 
other areas of law critical to the resolution of criminal cases: substantive 
criminal law, the law of sentencing and the law of evidence.  In developing its 
due process jurisprudence, the Supreme Court speaks as if it is applying rather 
than making law.  But the body of law falling under the rubric of due process is 
so expansive and its textual grounding so minimal, the Court appears in 
Professor Israel’s story to be making rather than applying law.  The justices 
appear to have treated the due process clause as a mandate to create a broad 
constitutional common law of criminal procedure.  This expansive use of 
judicial power under due process, as well as other constitutional provisions, is 
in marked contrast to the contraction of judicial power in substantive criminal 
law, sentencing and evidence. 
At the time the constitution was drafted, the job of defining criminal 
offenses was firmly in the hands of the judiciary.11  A movement toward 
codification started with the American Revolution and by the late 1800s was 
well under way.  Today, legislators have primary and virtually exclusive 
authority regarding the creation of new offenses.  Indeed, it is difficult in 
recent decades to find an example of the prosecution of a common law crime 
in either federal or state jurisdictions.12 
The judiciary undoubtedly still plays a significant though often 
controversial role in shaping the contours of the substantive criminal law 
through interpreting statutes.  Additionally, legislatures sometimes write 
criminal statutes so vaguely that the task of defining one or more elements of 
an offense shifts to the judiciary.13 
Despite these qualifications, two things are clear.  There has developed in 
this country a broad consensus that the work of defining criminal offenses 
should be done by legislators rather than judges.  And though judges 
nonetheless play a role in defining offenses, there has been a fundamental shift 
in power from judges to legislators in defining crimes compared with the days 
of common law crimes. 
In recent years, one finds a similar though less dramatic restriction of 
judicial power in the area of sentencing.  As late as 1985, a federal judge 
sentencing a criminal defendant exercised almost exclusive authority in 
 
 11. See Note, Common Law Crimes in the United States, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1332 (1947). 
 12. For one recent example of court approval of prosecution of a common law offense, see 
People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994). 
 13. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 5, 6-11 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law? 
110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 471-79 (1996). 
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choosing a sentence from an often wide range established by the statute under 
which the defendant had been convicted.14  In an armed bank robbery, for 
example, the judge could choose any sentence from straight probation to 
twenty-five years imprisonment.15  Driven largely by concern about disparities 
among sentences under a system giving judges so much discretionary power, a 
movement in favor of determinate sentencing sought to restrict that power.  In 
the federal system, that movement culminated in adoption of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, which greatly restrict the power of judges in 
sentencing, limiting them to choosing sentences within ranges typically 
marked by months rather than years.  Sentencing guidelines have been adopted 
in a number of states, though many are not as restrictive of judicial power as 
the federal guidelines.16 
The restriction of judicial power that has occurred in the area of sentencing 
is not as dramatic or universal as the restriction one finds in the creation and 
definition of offenses.  Some states have refused to adopt a guidelines 
approach,17 and the guidelines many states have adopted give greater power to 
judges than the federal guidelines.18  Even under the federal guidelines, judges 
have limited power to depart from the guidelines to impose either a more or 
less severe sentence.19  Nonetheless, the past several decades have witnessed 
an unmistakable movement toward confining the exercise of judicial power in 
the area of sentencing. 
The law of evidence provides another example of restriction of judicial 
power.  Like the common law of crimes, the law of evidence was created 
largely by judges.  Common law evidence rules were supplemented by 
occasional statutes on topics such as business records until a trend toward 
codification took hold in the twentieth century, culminating in the 1965 
California Evidence Code and the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence.  Today 
evidence law primarily takes the form of codes.20 
Judges still control some areas of evidence law.  Under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, for example, privilege rules21 and some areas of impeachment22 
have been left to common law development.  Judges also still play an 
 
 14. For a description of federal sentencing practice before and after adoption of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, see NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 
684-708 (3d. ed. 2000). 
 15. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 16. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing 
Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 426 (2000). 
 17. Id. at 427. 
 18. Id. at 427-30. 
 19. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 14, 726-47. 
 20. Some states, such as Missouri, still utilize common law evidence rules. 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 501; see ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW 383-84 (1998). 
 22. There are, for example, no federal rules controlling impeachment for bias or capacity.  
See PARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 459-67. 
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important role interpreting evidence rules, and trial judges in particular clearly 
exercise power in applying rules such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which 
grants the trial judge considerable discretion in controlling the admission of 
evidence through weighing probative value and need against dangers of 
prejudice, confusion, and waste of time.  Nonetheless, as in criminal law, there 
has been a sea change in attitude in the law of evidence over the past century 
about giving judges the power to create evidence rules. 
The contrast between restriction of judicial power in the areas of 
substantive criminal law, sentencing and evidence, and the expansion of 
judicial power described in Professor Israel’s article is marked.  As Professor 
Israel has noted, constitutional standards created by the justices of the Supreme 
Court have come to “constitute what is surely the most important single body 
of law governing the [criminal justice] process.”23  It stands in marked contrast 
not only to U.S. law on substantive crimes, sentencing, and evidence, but also 
in contrast to European systems which are code based.24  Ironically, the period 
typically viewed as the apogee of judicial lawmaking in the area of criminal 
procedure, the 1960s and 1970s, coincided with the culmination of the 
movement to remove evidentiary lawmaking from the judiciary—the 
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The Federal Rules not only 
codified the vast majority of federal evidence law, but also provided a catalyst 
and model for restricting the power of judges over evidence law in many 
states. 
The movement toward legislation and away from common law was not 
restricted to the areas of criminal law and evidence.  Rather, the shift in law-
making power from judges to legislators one finds in criminal law and 
evidence are typical of a larger phenomenon, which has led to our current legal 
culture being called “the age of statutes” 25 by Judge Guido Calabresi and “an 
age of legislation” 26 by Justice Antonin Scalia. 
Why this difference?  Why do we deny judges power over defining 
criminal offenses and evidence rules but grant them such power in the area of 
criminal procedure?  One response is that criminal procedure is an area with a 
 
 23. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
469 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter TREATISE]. 
 24. PIZZI, supra note 6, at 158. 
 25. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); 
see also ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS xv (1997) (“We live in an age of statutes in which the nation’s 
legislatures serve actively as the dominant institutions for determining public policy and 
translating it into law.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 17 (2000) (“[W]e live in a democracy, where today most of our law is made not 
by judges in common law cases but by popularly elected legislators adopting statutes and by 
administrative agencies promulgating rules and regulations.”). 
 26. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13 
(1997). 
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much more substantial constitutional dimension than substantive criminal law 
or evidence.  Criminal procedure receives more attention in the constitution 
than any subject other than the basic organization of the federal government. 
But the importance of judge-made constitutional rules in the field of 
criminal procedure is not simply a product of the number of constitutional 
provisions devoted to criminal procedure. It is also a result of the Supreme 
Court’s expansive interpretation of those provisions, particularly in the past 
forty years.  Why has our legal culture favored restriction of judicial power in 
some areas relating to criminal justice but tolerated expansion in another? 
Perhaps one finds in operation here a sort of law of dynamic homeostasis 
maintaining a general balance of power between the branches of government.  
As judicial power is curbed in one area, such as the creation of criminal 
offenses, there is a compensating expansion of power in the creation of 
criminal procedure rules.  Another possible explanation is that we find 
expansive judicial power more acceptable in creating new rules of criminal 
procedure than in creating new crimes since the expansion of procedural 
protections typically serves to protect the citizenry by restricting the imposition 
of liability, while the creation of new crimes expands liability. 
But what insight does this contrast offer to the craft problems highlighted 
by Professor Israel at the end of his lecture?  He points to two: (1) 
unacknowledged departures from prior case law and (2) ambiguities and 
inconsistencies among cases regarding the standards the Supreme Court has 
offered in support of its interpretations of due process in criminal cases.27 
These weaknesses are hardly unique to the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
due process in criminal cases.  One finds the same sort of problems, for 
example, in the Supreme Court’s minimum contacts cases applying due 
process to state exertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over defendants in civil 
cases.28  The Supreme Court’s minimum contacts jurisprudence reflects a 
gradual accumulation of a motley assortment of factors ranging from the 
defendant’s conduct and mental state to the federal government’s foreign 
policy interests.  Typically, new factors have been added without 
acknowledgment or justification of departure from past practice and with little 
if any attempt to integrate innovations with prior cases. 
Nor are such weaknesses restricted to the work of the Supreme Court.  
Rather, they are typical of judge-made common law.  Professor Israel’s 
complaints resonate with general criticism of judge made law made by 
champions of codification in many areas of law.  The common law of 
 
 27. Israel, supra note 1, at 427-32. 
 28. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed 
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 195-99 (1998). 
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evidence, for example, has been characterized as “a growing, changing, 
fractious and often contradictory body of precedents.”29 
The unacknowledged departures from prior case law might be the result of 
several different factors.  One possibility is that the justices are simply unaware 
of the existence of the prior cases they fail to acknowledge.  The fact that the 
corpus of Supreme Court case law devoted to due process has grown 
increasingly voluminous and complex would be consistent with such an 
explanation.  Accessibility problems are typical of common law.  Those who 
favored abandoning the common law approach in favor of codification of 
federal evidence law, for example, advanced the pragmatic argument that the 
common law of evidence was too voluminous and complex to be accurately 
found and understood by judges and lawyers in the midst of trials.30 
But other factors make it implausible that the justices would be unaware of 
relevant prior case law.  The justices have more time and support for research 
than a trial judge and in recent years have gained access to computerized 
databases to aid in locating relevant prior cases.  The justices also have the 
luxury of being able to devote their time and energy primarily to legal issues, 
as opposed to trial judges who must concern themselves with the resolution of 
both legal and factual issues. Parties appearing before the Supreme Court have 
typically had the opportunity to research the applicable precedents at both the 
trial and appellate levels before briefing the Supreme Court.  So one would 
think the parties would do a good job pointing out relevant prior cases even if 
the justices and their clerks had not found them on their own.  The Supreme 
Court also often has the advantage of opinions from lower courts, which have 
researched the applicable case law. 
A more plausible explanation for the problem of unacknowledged 
departures from prior cases is that the justices are aware of the prior cases from 
which they are departing but unwilling to openly acknowledge when they 
abandon an established approach and create something new.  Why might the 
justices hesitate to be candid about this?  First, the notion of fidelity to 
precedent may prove a hindrance to candor about the justices creating new 
legal rules.  Second, the conceit that the justices are simply applying 
constitutional text rather than creating new law may also be a barrier to candor.  
Finally, the fact that the justices are operating in an age of legislation, a legal 
 
 29. PARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 425-29. 
 30. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE 
AND PRACTICE 4 (“Making evidence law accessible is the main reason for the code that has 
become the most influential body of American evidence law—the Federal Rules of Evidence.”); 
Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the House Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of Federal 
Criminal Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R., 93d Cong. 90 (1973) (testimony of Albert 
Jenner) (“[T]he administration of justice in the federal courts is suffering seriously.  A major 
factor in this regard is the maelstrom of rules of evidence which must be presently ferreted out 
and applied by federal judges.”). 
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culture increasingly opposed to judges creating law, may help explain their 
reluctance to openly acknowledge active law making. 
The problem of ambiguities and inconsistencies between cases might also 
be explained in several ways.  Professor Israel’s ambition in seeking to tell the 
story of due process over a period of almost 120 years brings to mind a 
methodological divide I read of recently among geologists.31  There now exist 
two quite different approaches to understanding the earth’s history and 
structure.  Traditional geologists examine the earth’s surface at close range.  
They look at particular sections of the earth’s surface, scrutinizing the details 
of particular formations through field-work and by putting hammer to rock.  A 
new breed of geologist trained in physics, though, has recently brought to the 
field a set of techniques radically different from those of the traditional 
geologist.  Using satellite maps to examine huge sections of the globe at long 
range, these new geologists develop complicated mathematical models and 
universal laws on a much grander scale than traditional geologists. 
Like the earth’s surface, the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence is 
the product of a gradual, case-by-case process of accretion.32  Lawyers, judges 
and most academics, as Professor Israel points out in his article,33 consume the 
Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence the same way it is produced.  Like 
traditional geologists, they work with it in discrete chunks, examining at close 
range individual cases, such as Chambers v. Mississippi34 on the constitutional 
dimension of excluding hearsay offered by a criminal defendant, or clusters of 
cases dealing with particular issues, such as the line of cases from Brady v. 
Maryland35 through Strickler v. Greene36 on prosecutorial disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence. 
By contrast, Professor Israel adopts in his article a perspective on the 
Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence that is the scholarly equivalent of 
the physicist-geologist’s view of the earth’s surface.  He makes us look at the 
big picture, giving us a panoramic view across a wide range of criminal 
procedure issues from investigation to sentencing and covering more than a 
century of the Supreme Court’s work. 
Narrow framing, focusing one’s attention on a particular case or cluster of 
cases, reveals certain types of flaws in the Supreme Court’s work, such as lack 
of logical force or clarity in a particular opinion or inconsistencies within 
 
 31. See James Glanz, Physicists Invading Geologists’ Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at 
F1. 
 32. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME ix (1999) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court is part of a 
long historical tradition. Anglo-American courts often take small rather than large steps, 
bracketing the hardest and most divisive issues.”). 
 33. Israel, supra note 1, at 305. 
 34. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 35. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 36. 527 U.S. 263 (1999). 
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particular lines of cases relating to a particular subject.  But narrow framing 
insulates us from both the insights and challenges found in the larger story of 
due process. 
Inconsistencies and ambiguities of the sort Professor Israel points out 
emerge more clearly when one adopts the sort of broad framing found in 
Professor Israel’s article.  Though the work of the Supreme Court is often 
made up of issues of national importance, its method of making law, like the 
common law method generally, naturally inclines the justices toward narrow 
framing.  Developing legal principles in the context of resolving particular 
cases, as judges do, naturally runs the risk of over-attention to doing justice in 
the particular case and inattention to whether the resolution of that case is 
consistent with prior case law.  As Professor Israel points out, most academics 
criticizing the Court’s work also adopt this sort of narrow framing, so the 
academic literature has not exerted much corrective leverage on the Court. 
Since the weaknesses Professor Israel points out are typical of judge-made 
law, it is probably unrealistic to think that those weaknesses will change as 
long as the Court’s due process jurisprudence continues to be made by judges 
through a common law process.  Perhaps, though, Professor Israel’s article and 
others prompted by it adopting a similar broad viewpoint will increase the 
Court’s awareness of these problems and prompt improvement. 
II. DISTINGUISHING RULE FROM REMEDY 
A recurring craft problem which causes confusion in the Supreme Court’s 
due process and other criminal procedure cases is failure clearly to distinguish 
rule from remedy.  Appellate courts often need to treat the question of whether 
a rule was violated separately from what steps, if any, the court should take 
under the circumstances of a particular case to remedy a violation.  In 
assessing whether reversal of a trial court judgment and the granting of a new 
trial are appropriate remedies, appellate courts often look to the impact of a 
rule violation on the outcome of the case.37 
Assume, for example, an appellate court is confronted with a claim that a 
trial court’s admission of a criminal defendant’s prior criminal record violated 
the ban on character evidence.38  If the appellate court decides the character 
rule was in fact violated, it would not automatically reverse the trial court’s 
judgment and grant a new trial.  But if the erroneously admitted evidence 
 
 37. For examples of rules codifying such outcome oriented appellate review standards, see 
FED. R. EVID. 103(a); FED. R. CIV. PRO. 61; FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 52(a).  For an account of the 
rationale and development of such rules, see CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, 441-43 (2d. ed. 1995). 
 38. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
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affected the outcome of the trial, the appellate court typically would reverse 
and grant a new trial.39 
In the law of evidence, the Supreme Court and other appellate courts 
routinely partition their analysis of rule violation from their analysis of an 
appropriate remedy without great difficulty.  But the Supreme Court often fails 
to maintain that distinction in constitutional criminal procedure.  At one time it 
was thought that any constitutional error required reversal.40 But in Chapman 
v. California,41 the Supreme Court held that the harmless error doctrine may 
apply even to constitutional errors.  Since Chapman, the Supreme Court has at 
times collapsed the questions of rule violation and appropriate remedy into a 
single analysis and in doing so created confusion. 
A prime example of this confusion can be found in the line of Supreme 
Court due process cases dealing with prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence.  The first of these cases was Brady v. Maryland,42 a 1963 case in 
which the Court held that the prosecutor has a due process obligation to 
disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense.  In Brady, the Court did 
not define the term material.  One plausible reading of Brady is that the Court 
used the term material in a broad sense, as a synonym for relevance, a common 
meaning in the law of evidence.  Under this broad interpretation, the 
prosecutor would need to disclose all relevant exculpatory evidence.  But it is 
also possible to interpret Brady as suggesting a narrow interpretation of the 
term material as including only items of exculpatory evidence which have 
particularly high probative value. 
Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court dealt with this ambiguity about the 
scope of the Brady disclosure rule by adopting a two-tiered approach in United 
States v. Agurs.43  If the defense specifically requested an item, the materiality 
standard was broad.  The prosecutor was required to turn over anything that 
might have affected the outcome.  Without a specific request, a narrower 
standard applied.  The prosecutor was required to turn such items over only if 
they would have created reasonable doubt.  Nine years later, in United States v. 
Bagley, the Supreme Court abandoned the two-tiered Agurs approach to 
materiality in favor of exclusive use of a narrow test.44  Under Bagley, 
prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence only “if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”45 
 
 39. See PARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 542-47. 
 40. Id. at 551 (“Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chapman v. California, it was 
thought that constitutional errors were always grounds for reversal.”). 
 41. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
 42. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 43. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 44. 473 U.S. 667, 681-84 (1985). 
 45. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
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In the course of roughly twenty years, then, the Supreme Court went from 
failing to define materiality, to simultaneously embracing both broad and 
narrow definitions of materiality in a bifurcated analysis, to what appears in 
Bagley to be a single, narrow definition.  In the course of these various twists 
and turns, it collapsed two different inquiries, the scope of a defendant’s right 
to receive exculpatory information and whether a violation of that right 
mandates reversal and a new trial.  These developments have had a number of 
unhappy consequences. 
One is the awkwardness of the phrasing of the Brady rule found in Bagley.  
It is phrased as an ex post rule which looks back at a finished trial, asking what 
“would have been different” at the trial if the exculpatory evidence had been 
disclosed.  This makes sense for a remedy rule, which is typically applied 
retrospectively by an appellate court after the trial has been concluded. But this 
phrasing makes no sense as a rule of disclosure, which is typically applied 
prospectively by a prosecutor before trial.  A prosecutor deciding whether or 
not to disclose exculpatory evidence before trial obviously cannot look back at 
a trial that has yet to take place. 
Even if one recasts the Bagley materiality standard as an ex ante rule 
requiring prediction of whether the Brady information would affect the 
outcome of an upcoming trial, practical application problems remain.  Imagine 
a pre-trial defense motion seeking certain information under the Brady rule, to 
which the prosecution responds by asserting that the requested information 
does not meet the Bagley materiality test.  Assume the judge agrees to review 
the disputed information in camera to determine whether it is material.  How 
can the judge apply the Bagley materiality test and predict how the requested 
information will affect the outcome of the trial without detailed knowledge of 
the evidence which will be introduced at trial by both the prosecution and 
defense?  The judge is unlikely to have such detailed knowledge of the 
evidence prior to trial.  By contrast, a judge without detailed knowledge of the 
other evidence could apply prior to trial a test that casts materiality simply in 
terms of probative value relative to an important issue in the case. 
A third problem is lingering ambiguity about the scope of the disclosure 
rule, ample evidence of which is found in Strickler v. Greene,46 the Court’s 
most recent encounter with the Brady disclosure rule.  Consider the following 
passage from Justice Stevens’ opinion in Strickler: 
[The prosecutor’s] special status explains both the basis for the prosecution’s 
broad duty of disclosure and our conclusion that not every violation of that 
duty necessarily establishes that the outcome was unjust.  Thus the term 
“Brady violation” is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad 
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence—that is, to any suppression of so-
called “Brady material”—although, strictly speaking, there is never a real 
 
 46. 527 U.S. 263 (1999). 
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“Brady violation” unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a 
reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a 
different verdict.47 
The Supreme Court in Strickler reaffirmed Bagley’s narrow materiality 
standard.  Nonetheless, Justice Stevens refers twice here to the prosecutor’s 
“broad” disclosure duty and obligation as if the broad interpretation of 
materiality were still viable.  He attempts to clarify the ambiguity between the 
broad and narrow views of materiality by resorting to the adjectives “so called” 
and “real.”  A “so called” Brady violation is failure to disclose evidence that 
satisfies the broad materiality standard.  A “real” Brady violation is failure to 
disclose evidence that would probably have changed the outcome.  
Distinguishing more effectively and consistently between rule and remedy 
would help ameliorate such confusion in the Brady area and in other areas of 
due process as well. 
III. METHODOLOGY IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 
Professor Israel focuses his lecture on the Supreme Court’s interpretative 
guidelines and the use of those guidelines in resolving issues presented in 
particular due process cases.  What policies, though, drive the selection of 
these guidelines?  One source of confusion and incoherence in the Supreme 
Court’s due process cases is the Court’s failure to address and to articulate the 
purposes that methodology seeks to serve. 
The purposes of substantive criminal law have been and continue to be the 
subject of extensive examination and vigorous debate.  Justifications such as 
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation, for example, provide the axes 
around which academic and public debate revolves on many criminal justice 
issues, such as imposition of the death penalty.  But the purposes of criminal 
procedure, by contrast, have not received much attention.  Rather, they have 
typically been treated as “obvious and noncontroversial.”48  Professor Peter 
Arenella has described “a glaring deficiency in criminal justice scholarship: the 
failure to identify the functions served by American criminal procedure.”49  In 
attempting to assess and compare the work of the Warren and Burger Courts in 
the area of criminal procedure, Professor Arenella concludes that “[w]ithout a 
clearer understanding of criminal procedure’s functions, we cannot begin to 
 
 47. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (citations omitted). 
 48. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and 
Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 185-86 (1983) (“What functions are 
served by criminal procedure?  For the most part, American criminal justice scholarship has 
assumed that the answers to this question are obvious and noncontroversial.”). 
 49. Id. at 247. 
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make any useful comparison of the two Courts’ approaches to criminal 
procedure.”50 
This lack of close attention to the purposes of criminal procedure among 
legal academics is mirrored in the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure 
opinions, including those on due process.  Rarely does the Court address the 
ultimate purposes of due process in particular or criminal procedure in general.  
When the Court does mention a justification or purpose of a particular criminal 
procedure right, it does so in passing and with cursory treatment at best.  
Professor Arenella’s point that it is difficult to make sense of the Warren and 
Burger Courts’ criminal procedure legacies without first articulating the 
purposes criminal procedure seeks to serve is equally valid when it comes to 
making sense of the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence. 
Looking at the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence from the broad 
perspective offered in Professor Israel’s article, I felt a bit as I did when I once 
took a ride in a hot air balloon.  The increasingly dramatic view of the 
surrounding landscape revealed as the balloon rose higher and higher gave me 
an uneasy combination of exhilaration and nausea.  The broad expanse of the 
Supreme Court’s due process methodology revealed in the course of reading 
Professor Israel’s article produced a similar ambivalence.  Many of the themes 
that emerge in the history of the Supreme Court’s due process methodology are 
quite interesting.  But the inconsistencies and confusion in methodology 
reminded me of Lawrence Friedman’s description of the evolution of due 
process as being characterized by “zigs and zags and lurches, like a drunk 
trying to walk a straight line.”51  The Supreme Court’s failure to focus on and 
articulate where it has been headed in its journey of developing the meaning of 
due process in modern American criminal procedure may help explain these 
“zigs and zags and lurches.” 
One question the Court has neglected in its general failure to examine and 
articulate the purposes of criminal procedure is whether criminal procedure 
rules such as the right to due process are supported by any non-instrumental 
justification.  Instrumental and non-instrumental approaches to justifying legal 
rules are found in many areas of law.  The instrumental view is prospective; it 
focuses on the interests of society rather than on the rights or responsibilities of 
individuals and relies on instrumental rather than moral criteria.52  The non-
instrumental view, in contrast, is retrospective; it focuses on the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals and relies on moral rather than instrumental 
criteria.53 
 
 50. Id. at 248. 
 51. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 56 
(1993). 
 52. McMunigal, supra note 28, at 199. 
 53. Id. at 200. 
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These differences are readily apparent in criminal law and torts.  An 
instrumental approach to criminal law might see criminal punishment as an 
instrument for advancing the socially-useful goal of reducing future crime 
through deterrence, rehabilitation or incapacitation.54  A non-instrumental view 
of criminal law often labeled “just deserts” sees criminals as being properly 
punished because they deserve it based on past wrongdoing, not because it will 
provide any future benefit to society.55  An instrumental approach might see 
tort law as a means for advancing the collective social goals of deterrence or 
cost-spreading.56  A non-instrumental view often called “corrective justice,” by 
contrast, looks to the respective moral rights and responsibilities of individual 
actors to determine the distribution of tort liability.57 
Is there an analog in criminal procedure to the “just deserts” approach to 
criminal law and the “corrective justice” approach to torts?  Professor George 
Fletcher has written “[t]he most common mode of moral reasoning in the 
Anglo-American tradition is cost/benefit analysis—the ‘balancing’ of 
competing advantages and disadvantages of adopting particular courses of 
action. As the argument goes, all legal decisions (by individuals as well as 
courts) should be judged according to their consequences.”58  The tendency 
toward instrumental thinking is particularly strong in the area of procedure, 
often viewed as simply a means for enforcing the rights and obligations found 
in substantive law.59  Professor Israel’s treatise, for example, begins by 
defining criminal procedure as “ the law governing that series of procedures 
through which the substantive criminal law is enforced.”60 
In thinking about criminal procedure, then, we naturally tend to gravitate 
toward justifying and measuring procedural rights in instrumental terms, by 
assessing the consequences of applying or failing to apply those rights on 
objectives such as enforcing substantive criminal law, discovering historical 
truth, minimizing factual errors, cost, efficiency, deterring police misconduct 
or maintaining public respect for the criminal justice system.  But is the 
justification for criminal procedure rights in general and due process in 
 
 54. See, e.g., Johannes Andeneas, Deterrence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 
591, 592 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). 
 55. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, 
CHARACTER, AND EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). 
 56. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW (1987). 
 57. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part I, 1 
LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982). 
 58. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 144 (1996). 
 59. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1203-04 (6th ed. 1990) (defining procedure as 
“the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced”); BRYAN A. GARNER, A 
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 697 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that “[p]rocedural law . . . 
consists of the rules by which one establishes one’s rights, duties, liberties, and powers”). 
 60. 1 TREATISE, supra note 23, at 5. 
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particular exclusively instrumental?  Do we give defendants due process only 
because of the useful consequences it may produce, such as a more accurate 
determination of factual guilt?  Or is due process in part accorded to individual 
defendants based on a moral intuition that defendants deserve certain 
procedural rights, that certain types of process are due to individuals 
threatened by the government with loss of liberty or life through imposition of 
a criminal sanction apart from whatever socially useful consequences such 
process produces?  The Supreme Court’s lack of attention to the underlying 
purposes of criminal procedure make it difficult to answer this question.  The 
Court’s frequent emphasis on results and, in particular, on the factual accuracy 
of the determination of guilt, suggest a negative answer to this question.  But 
other aspects of the Court’s work, such as its exemption of certain cases from 
harmless error analysis, may be read as consistent with non-instrumental 
reasoning. 
The Supreme Court’s failure to address the purposes of criminal procedure 
causes confusion because it masks the tensions which may arise among 
different and at times competing purposes.  Even if one adopts a strictly 
utilitarian view of the purposes of criminal procedure, various utilitarian goals 
can conflict.  Cost and accuracy, for example, are perennially at odds.  
Extensive appellate review, for example, may increase accuracy in terms of 
fact determination and application of the law, but it increases cost.  Limitations 
on the amount and scope of appellate review represent a compromise between 
these competing goals.  By failing to address and articulate the purposes of 
criminal procedure, the Court provides no means for recognizing and openly 
resolving such tensions on a consistent, principled basis. 
If one recognizes a non-utilitarian aspect to the purposes of criminal 
procedure rules, the potential for conflict between utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
values adds another potential source of tension to those which may already 
arise among utilitarian goals.  Again, an advantage of having the Supreme 
Court address and articulate the purposes of criminal procedure would be to 
force the Court to confront this tension and provide some means for resolving 
it.  Professor Paul Robinson has written about the need for developing mixed 
theories in substantive criminal law to deal with such tensions.  When such 
conflicts occur, 
ultimately a choice must be made to follow one purpose at the expense of 
another. Yet, when faced with conflicting purposes, judges, legislators, and 
sentencing-guideline drafters have no principle to guide that decision. In the 
absence of a guiding principle, the choices made are at best inconsistent . . . .  
At worst, the absence of a guiding principle fosters arbitrariness or prejudice.61 
 
 61. Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. 
U. L. REV. 19, 20 (1987) (citations omitted). 
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Professor Robinson’s point about substantive criminal law is equally valid 
when applied to the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure cases in general and 
due process cases in particular. The Supreme Court’s failure to acknowledge, 
much less provide guidance in resolving, such tensions in part explains the 
inconsistency and ambiguity found in the Supreme Court’s due process 
jurisprudence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Professor Israel encourages us to use a wide lens in assessing the Supreme 
Court’s due process jurisprudence.  Doing so provides grounds for both 
pessimism and optimism about improving the craft of due process in the 
Court’s work.  The fact that some of the flaws he identifies are typical of 
common law process suggests there is little reason to be optimistic about 
remedying those flaws as long as the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence continues 
to develop through what is essentially a common law process.  But the wide 
lens Professor Israel’s article prompts us to use may help in remedying these 
flaws by bringing them into clearer view for both the Court and its academic 
critics. 
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